Association for Information Systems

AIS Electronic Library (AISeL)
ACIS 2005 Proceedings

Australasian (ACIS)

December 2005

Electronic Reverse Auctions: Changing the Balance
of Power from Suppliers to Buyers?
Donna Charlesworth
Coventry University

Brian Jeffery
Coventry University

Gerry Urwin
Coventry University

Follow this and additional works at: http://aisel.aisnet.org/acis2005
Recommended Citation
Charlesworth, Donna; Jeffery, Brian; and Urwin, Gerry, "Electronic Reverse Auctions: Changing the Balance of Power from Suppliers
to Buyers?" (2005). ACIS 2005 Proceedings. 38.
http://aisel.aisnet.org/acis2005/38

This material is brought to you by the Australasian (ACIS) at AIS Electronic Library (AISeL). It has been accepted for inclusion in ACIS 2005
Proceedings by an authorized administrator of AIS Electronic Library (AISeL). For more information, please contact elibrary@aisnet.org.

16th Australasian Conference on Information Systems
29 Nov – 2 Dec 2005 Sydney

Electronic Reverse Auctions
Donna Charlesworth

Electronic Reverse Auctions:
Changing the Balance of Power from Suppliers to Buyers?
Donna M. Charlesworth
Brian Jeffery
Dr. Gerry Urwin
Coventry Business School
Coventry University
Coventry CV1 5FB
United Kingdom
G.Urwin@coventry.ac.uk

ABSTRACT
This exploratory study investigates whether Electronic Reverse Auctions (ERAs) cause a ‘power shift’ from
suppliers to buyers. It is important to develop greater understanding of this emerging issue in ERA literature in
order that procurement professionals can benefit from ERA application.
A review of the literature identifies bargaining power determinants, forming the basis of a conceptual model. The
research explores the balance of power in sourcing processes that utilise ERAs and evaluates the degree to which
the power balance is attributable to ERA. Two contrasting case studies, are developed these suggest that ERAs have
the potential to increase the power of buying organisations, relative to suppliers, in the sourcing process.
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INTRODUCTION
Since the first model for business to business online reverse auctions, pioneered by FreeMarkets in 1995 (Emiliani,
2000), ERAs have developed the profile of Purchasing (Supply Management, 2002; Arminas, 2003) and additional
e-Procurement tools (Arminas, 2003). A report by I-Adapt (2003) followed by Beall et al (2003) focussed on ERA
impact on buyer-supplier relationships. I-Adapt (2003) suggested “more than half [of suppliers] felt confident that
they gave buyers no more power over them” (Parker, 2003a: 10), yet, suppliers also cited that “the buyer becomes
too dominant” (I-Adapt, 2003: 4). Since Beall et al (2003: 54) enquire “Do E-RA’ Result in a Shift in Power from
Suppliers to Buyers?” and Emiliani (2000: 184) asks “Are online auctions a truly new method of procurement, or do
they simply facilitate traditional heavy-handed procurement methods?”, it is important to establish if ERAs are
perpetuating traditional power-based bargaining by ‘electronic coercion’ (Emiliani and Stec, 2002a).
This paper has three objectives: first, a synthesis of the relevant literature will allow the development of a
conceptual model, developing understanding of the factors that determine the bargaining power of buyers and
suppliers; secondly, two case studies will be used to investigate the impact of ERAs on power determinants; and to
evaluate the degree to which power balance is attributable to ERA; third, a discussion of the implications of the
findings will lead to recommendations for future research.. The scope of this study is limited to organisational
power, as opposed to social power and power bases (French and Raven; cited in Huczynski. & Buchanan, 2001).

LITERATURE REVIEW
ERAs are coordinating mechanisms (Janssen and Sol, 2000) that connect one buying organisation and many selling
organisations in real-time, with online negotiation using proprietary software. Unlike other auction typologies,
sellers place multiple bids against visible competitor offers, enabling price descent and dynamic pricing. Multiattribute formats are also available (Porter, A, 2000) that consider non-price variables e.g. continuous improvement
rates (Contract Journal, 2004), for which Talluri and Ragatz (2004) have developed a useful framework.
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These are commonly implemented using Application Service Providers (ASPs) (Smith and Rupp, 2002) or ‘market
makers’ (Emiliani and Stec, 2002b), which fulfil ‘trust’; ‘aggregation’; ‘matching’ and ‘facilitating’ roles (Bailey
and Bakos, 1997; cited in Janssen and Sol, 2000) and additional services e.g. Request For Proposal (RFP)
development and market advice, excluding implementation support. Some ‘power users’ conduct ERAs in-house,
whilst others have developed marketplaces, like Covisint (Wyld, 2002), ChemConnect (Hannon, 2003) and Exostar
(Flynn, 2003), for the Automobile, Chemical and Aerospace and Defence industries, respectively.
ERA application is appropriate when:•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

An adequate number of qualified suppliers exist, with spare capacity (John, 2002; Mabert and Schoenherr,
2001).
Supply exceeds demand (Mabert and Schoenherr, 2001).
The product or service is unequivocally specified (Beall et al, 2003; John, 2002; Emiliani, 2000).
No constraints exist e.g. long-term partnerships (Mabert and Schoenherr, 2001).
The Buying organisation is willing to change suppliers with acceptable switching costs (Beall et al, 2003;
Mabert and Schoenherr, 2001).
Contract value/volumes are high/attractive to suppliers (John, 2002).
Probability that current prices exceed market prices, is high (Beall et al, 2003)
Suppliers are willing to participate in the ERA (Beall et al, 2003).

The Supply Positioning model counsels that ERAs should only be used for purchasing tactical goods, though ERAs
have been used for strategic purchases (Beall et al, 2003). Tactical profit, buyer-centric markets, meet the above
requirements. Buyers are more price focussed and likely to exercise buyer power in perfect competition markets.
Emiliani (2000: 178) suggests that ERAs “work best when… the buyer has leverage or otherwise dominates the
relationship”, supported by other literature (Supply Management, 2003a; Supplier Selection and Management
Report, 2003). Therefore, even at this early stage, it could be suggested that buyer power is more of a prerequisite
than an effect of ERAs. This will be explored later.
The Supplier Preferencing model suggests that suppliers will only participate in ERAs if the account is attractive
with high revenues. Using Supply Positioning and Supplier Preferencing theories together, indicates that ERAs will
be unsuccessful in Tactical Profit markets, when suppliers view the contract as unattractive. Therefore Tactical
Profit markets do not necessarily afford buyers the balance of power.

IMPACT OF ERAS ON THE SOURCING PROCESS
ERAs replace price negotiations. The traditional sourcing process structure is maintained (Smeltzer and Ruzicka,
2000), illustrated in Figures 1 and 2, yet, the requirements and duration of each stage are modified. For example,
upstream preparation increases, e.g. detailed RFPs (Emiliani and Stec, 2002b) but negotiation time decreases from
days/weeks to minutes. This raises some important questions. How has this time reduction affected suppliers’
propensity to take risks? Stein and Wyld (2003) explain that suppliers experience a frantic ‘end game’, illustrated
by ERA screenshots
, encouraging “suppliers to act like desperate Las Vegas gambler” (New Civil Engineer 2002: 6).

Analyse
demand

Identify
qualified
suppliers

Issue and
evaluate
returned
RFPs

Price and
SLA
Negotiations

Award
business if
conditions
met

Follow-up
and
Re-sourcing

Figure 1. Traditional sourcing process
How does the replacement of negotiations, traditionally the arena of buyer-supplier power struggles, affect the
power game? Do suppliers still play their cards close to their chests or, by making buyers passive observers (Beall et
al, 2003), with access to different information from suppliers (Emiliani, 2000), have ERAs improved the view of the
suppliers’ hand? Emiliani and Stec (2002a) argue that ERAs have reduced information flow to buyers, because
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suppliers withhold information e.g. price breakdowns. Instead, suppliers gain a better understanding of their
competitive position (Supplier Selection and Management Report, 2002; Emiliani, 2000) benefiting current and
subsequent ERAs (Stein and Wyld, 2003).
Yet, the ‘rules of the game’ are in the buyers’ favour (Emiliani and Stec, 2002a). Prior to the auction, buyers
establish a reserve price and minimum bid increments reducing suppliers’ pricing freedom. Price secrecy policies
create supplier information inefficiencies, forcing suppliers to rely on ‘fuzzy information’ and risk averse sellers to
trade lower profit for greater certainty of contract award (Hallwood, 1996). Additionally, buyer literature and ERA
pilot programmes have enabled buyers to better understand the ‘rules of the game’ and ERA processes. New
consultancy services like ‘ForeSource’ (Parker, 2003b) and ‘e-Three’ (Arminas, 2004a), offering supplier advice
and training, are only just redressing the balance of information.

Invitation
to ERA

Analyse
demand &
assess ERA
opportunity

Identify
qualified
suppliers

Start

Issue and
evaluate
returned
RFPs

Offers
from
suppliers

Supplier
Training

Electronic
Reverse
Auction

Acceptance
of offers by
software

Preparing
ERA
software

Introducing
initial prices

SLA
Negotiations

Acceptance
of offer

Award
business if
conditions
met

Follow-up
and
Re-sourcing

Analysis of
results and
documents

Adapted from: e-Auctions: Click to procure; Beall et al, (2003: 30)
Figure 2. ERA sourcing process

Do ERAs affect the number of players? ASPs improve awareness of qualified suppliers (John, 2002; Supply
Management, 2003b; Institute of Management and Administration, 2002) e.g. Freemarkets use ‘domain experts’
(Dupin and Saccomano, 2003; Emiliani, 2000). Though “e-tools... should never be seen as a replacement for the
market knowledge of buyers” (Boulby, 2003: 18). Real time price bidding enables consideration of “up to 50-60
suppliers” (Emiliani, 2000: 179), though sourcing time constraints can limit the number of suppliers qualified
(Porter, A, 2000; Tucker and Jones, 2000). Yet, buyers have a tradition of inviting incumbent, or approved suppliers
with proven competence (Tucker and Jones, 2000), or trade secret confidentiality dependence (Kisiel, 2000).
Moreover, an increasing number of suppliers are refusing to participate (Institute of Management and
Administration, 2002; John, 2002; Trecha, 2003; Hunt, 2003), notoriously in the construction industry (Arminas,
2004b).

IMPACT OF ERAS ON SOURCING PROCESS OUTCOMES
Stein and Wyld (2003) suggest buyers are the ERA winners, achieving high price savings. Average savings range
from 16% (Settoon and Wyld, 2003), 20% (LeSueur, 2001), to 20-50% (Carbone, 2003). DaimlerChrysler famously
saved “estimated tens of millions of dollars” (Wyld, 2002: 38). Yet, most published savings do not account for
direct and indirect losses (Emiliani and Stec, 2002b) and only 40% of lowest bidders are successful (Carbone, 2003).
Emiliani (2000) and Trech (2003) suggest that savings depend on the buying organisations’ ‘starting point’ and
practices. Do buyers have more power in ERAs than in traditional negotiations? IBM suggests not (Carbone, 2003)
supported by 43% of ERA buyers (Hunt, 2003).
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However, technology alone is not enough, “the auction is a passive tool; It is how you use it that determines its
success” (Supply Management, 2003b: 41). Research by PMMS Consultants suggests that technology, without
purchasing excellence, will deliver 1.2% instead of a 14% saving. ERAs are not a substitute for best practice
procurement.
Terms and Conditions in resulting contracts are also buyer weighted. Emiliani and Stec (2001) found buyers lacked
commitment to purchase volumes and financially punished suppliers for poor quality, though these were also used in
traditional processes. As a result, many small suppliers (fewer than 200 employees) were prevented from
participating in ERAs. It is important therefore, that buyers are aware of their long-term enlightened self-interest.

IMPACT OF ERAS ON BUYER–SUPPLIER RELATIONS
Previously, Knudsen (2003) suggested that e-Procurement tools resulted in arms’ length supplier relationships,
though PMMS Consultants advise that this is the desired relationship when operating in Tactical Profit markets.
Recent research (I-Adapt, 2003, Beall et al, 2003) however, suggests that ERAs have no detrimental influence on
sustainable supplier-buyer relationships (Beall et al, 2003; Parker, 2002) but actually improve supplier performance
against service levels (Beall et al, 2003) and five key variables from 8 – 22 % (I-Adapt, 2003).
Trust between buyer and supplier has always been an industry ‘pain-point’ (Raisch, 2001; cited in Stein and Wyld,
2003). Griffiths (2003) believes ERAs promote trust, by reducing doubt in price validity. However, it is hard to see
how driving prices down as low as possible can create any trust (Bartholomew, 2001; cited in Stein and Wyld,
2003), especially when buying organisations take a duplicitous approach (Emiliani, 2000).
Again, ERA impact on supply-chain relationships depends on buyer conduct. “Online Reverse auctions are a
powerful tool. Consistent with any other tool, the more powerful it is, the greater can be the damage if misused”
(Griffiths, 2003: 194). Beall et al (2003) found that ERAs improve the state of ethics. Yet, compared to other eProcurement tools, ASP’s have made less ethical information available on ERAs (Abbiati, 2003). Only recently
have ERA codes of conduct, like ‘e-Three Integrity’ (Supply Management, 2003c) and the ‘CIC Briefing note’
(Parker, 2004) been developed.
No direct study of the impact of ERA on the buyer-supplier power balance has been conducted, though many have
the ‘opinion’ that buyers possess power therein (Draper, 2004; Beall et al, 2003; Carbone, 2003). Others suggest the
balance of power depends on relative economic conditions (Beall et al, 2003; Carbone, 2003). Wyld’s eProcurement model (2000; cited in Stein and Wyld, 2003) suggests that e-Procurement generally shifts power to
buyers.
Key themes in the literature (illustrated on the left side in Figure 3, below) indicate that ERAs have changed the
power game between buyers and suppliers, in the buyers’ favour, yet, the extent of this ‘power shift’ remains
uncertain, since there is also evidence of supplier benefits. Space restrictions limit the detail of exposition in this
paper, however a look at the determinants of power will further this debate, and some of the key elements are
summarised on the right side of Figure 3 below.
Power is predominantly defined as the ability of one entity to cause changes in the behaviour of another entity, to
achieve the desired objective (Farrell and Schroder, 1999; Pfeffer, 1981; Shamdasani et al, 2001). Inherent in all
definitions of power is the idea of control and influence of one party’s behaviour by another (Cartwright, 1959; cited
by Dapiran and Hogarth-Scott, 2003). If buyer power exists, the buyer must be able to change supplier behaviour, to
achieve the buyer’s objectives.
Furthermore, the actions of the seller must represent an extension from the status quo. The buying organisation must
be “able to obtain from a supplier more favourable terms than those already available to other buyers” (OECD,
1981; cited by Clarke et al, 2002: 27). Moreover, the control of the buyer “should be different from the influenced
member’s [sellers] original level of control over his own marketing strategy” (El-Ansary and Stern, 1972; cited in
Shamdasani et al, 2001: 22).
Power exists in industry structure. Porter, M (1980) suggests the strength of five competitive forces, including buyer
and supplier bargaining power, determine an industry’s economic structure, level of competition and profits. This
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dictates the strategic choices available to, and chosen by firms operating therein. It could be argued that ERAs cause
industries to evolve, increasing competitive rivalry between suppliers. Moreover, as stated earlier, ERA application
is partly entrenched in industry characteristics; therefore, the buyer-supplier power balance can be a determinant,
rather than an effect of ERA application.
Porter, M (1980) further differentiates between the above intrinsic power and the propensity to exercise power:
having power and using power (Porter, M, 1980; Clarke et al, 2002). Propensity to exercise bargaining power
correlates positively with increased price sensitivity and is linked to organisational factors in the context of the
external environment (Porter, M, 1980). ERA may not be increasing buyer power but encouraging buyers to utilise
their existing intrinsic power, creating the illusion of an intrinsic power shift. Do ERAs develop or attract price
sensitive buyers? It is naïve to imply that organisations have not previously exercised bargaining power because
technological applications did not exist.
The first objective for this paper was to develop understanding of the factors that determine the bargaining power of
buyers and suppliers. It is evident that key themes extracted from ERA literature and Power literature (left and right
of Figure 3) overlap. From this synthesis, it can be argued that ERAs may influence the buyer-supplier power
balance. It is the attempt to understand this proposed relationship further which drives the research described in the
methodology section below.

METHODOLOGY
Variation in ERA contexts, processes, formats and buyer ethics, discussed in the literature review complicate
generalisation of ERAs. The use of power is considered negatively, equated with ‘fear and intimidation’ (Kumar,
1996; cited in Dapiran and Hogarth-Scott, 2003), hence respondents may be reluctant to admit its existence.
Commercially sensitive information was also required. These considerations meant trust and credibility were critical
to the primary research. Research methods needed to allow exploration of ERA variables and organisational context
and gain the respondents’ trust, to accurately demonstrate the affect of ERA on buyer/supplier bargaining power. An
interpretivist approach was appropriate given the above considerations. This enabled discovery of the “details of the
situation to understand the reality” (Remenyi, 1998) e.g. ERA variations and respondents’ perceptions of ERA.
This research adopted a case study approach (Riley et al, 2000), “an empirical investigation of a particular
contemporary phenomenon within its real life context using multiple sources of evidence” (Robson, 2002; cited in
Saunders et al, 2003: 93). This was suited to the ‘what’ and ‘how’ questions proposed and enabled investigation of
the context complexity, given its detailed, qualitative and interactive nature and high validity level (Yin, 1994).
Each case
study considered the buyer, supplier and ASP perspective. Only direct participants responsible for the sourcing
process provided data. Such persons had necessary detail and competence to provide information. Sample selection
criteria included auctioned product/service; organisational type of ownership; characteristics of Purchasing
department (structure, experience, size and professionalism); and ASP. Successful suppliers were the most
accessible given incumbent relationship with buyers, though this may create bias in the research.
Case 1: This buying organisation, in the utilities sector, tendered three products, stationery, copier paper and
computer consumables, simultaneously, using three separate ERAs in January 2003. At the time of the sourcing
process, the centralised Purchasing department employed around 30 professional buyers - this was their second ERA
experience. The successful supplier for stationery and copier paper was the leading independent stationer and fourth
largest stationery supplier in the UK at the time. The ASP was experienced in the utilities and public procurement
sectors.
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POWER THEMES

ERA THEMES

ERA APPLICATION

INTRINSIC POWER

Importance of purchase to seller
THE SOURCING PROCESS
Buyer/seller concentration
ERA event
Qualified alternatives
Information trades
Buyer ability to switch suppliers
ERA ‘rules of the game’
Process costs
ASP Market information
Threat of vertical integration
Number of suppliers
PROPENSITY TO EXERCISE POWER
PROCESS OUTCOMES
Importance of product to buyer
Savings
Product differentiation
Technology is not enough
Information
Terms and Conditions
Buyer motivations
Buyer Ethics
Buyer ability to pass on the cost of inputs
BUYER-SUPPLIER RELATIONSHIPS
POWER IN THE SOURCING PROCESS
Trust
Information provided by the buyer
Power
Information provided by the seller
Trust
Process Outcomes

Figure 3. Relationships between key themes in ERA and Power literature
Case 2: The buying organisation, a Metropolitan Borough Council, tendered a contract for copier paper, using one
ERA, for the first time, in February 2003. This organisation was highly decentralised with only 2.5 FTEs with
purchasing experience. The successful supplier was a local independent paper merchant, £14million annual
turnover. The ASP had not previously conducted ERAs in UK public sector. In-depth interviews generated
qualitative explanatory insights (Riley et al, 2000). Semi-structured interviews, consistent with the research
considerations, enabled exploration with regard to the identified power determinants and ERA effects therein.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
The findings are presented in two sections, corresponding with the research questions. The first determines the
buyer-supplier power balance during the investigated sourcing processes. The second analyses the extent to which
this diagnosis is the result of ERA. Both sections are divided into three subsections as outlined in Figure 3.; Intrinsic
Power, Propensity to Exercise Power and Evidence of Power in the Sourcing Process. These results are illustrated in
Appendix 1 Case Study Analysis.
This study aimed to identify and develop understanding of the factors that determine the bargaining power of buyers
and suppliers, and this was achieved through the synthesis of the academic literature in this field, resulting in the
conceptual model illustrated in figure 3. Further, two case studies offered evidence of power determinants and some
evaluation of the degree to which the power balance is attributable to ERA’s (appendix 1). These factors were
divided into three categories; intrinsic power, propensity to exercise power and evidence of power throughout the
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sourcing process. No evidence of significant intrinsic buyer power was found. However, supplier power was less
obvious than that of the buyers, who were very willing to exercise any power they had, or perceived they had. This
suggests that, in relative terms, buyers had power. Yet, evidence throughout the sourcing process indicated both
buyer and supplier power, again suggesting that the ‘power-shift’ was not absolute. Interestingly, the highest
intrinsic power, and propensity to exercise power in case 1 was moderated by trust in the buyer-supplier
relationship, thus power may not necessarily be a factor in all ERA processes.
The degree to which this power balance was attributable to ERA, was evaluated by investigating the impact of
ERAs on bargaining power determinants. The Secondary Literature Review also established that ERAs are mainly
applicable in buyer-centric supply markets and questioned whether the perceived power-shift was ‘reality’ or
‘illusion’.
The ‘reality’ was explored by investigating changes made by ERAs to power determinants. The effects of ERA on
intrinsic power and propensity to exercise buyer power were found to be more extensive in case 2, than case 1,
highlighting the importance of ‘starting points’. Buying organisations with less procurement resources and
experience have more scope to realise ERA potential; to increase the number of suppliers willing to participate in
the sourcing process, decrease process costs and gain additional information resources, thus increase buyer power.
When ASPs are selected and used as consultants as opposed to ERA software providers, power factors are affected
more, in the buyers’ favour. To implement successful ERAs buyers must also have detailed specifications and
contract information. Therefore, to some extent, ERAs are demanding and implementing best practice procurement,
which places the buyer in a relatively more powerful position.
However, best practice also entails the development of open and honest buyer-supplier relationships, to which ERAs
have been found to contribute. ERAs require a ‘level playing field’, increased trust and facilitate face-to-face
discussion. Thus for organisations with high ‘starting points’, power may not be an issue. Yet, suppliers’ reaction to
the word ‘e-auction’ indicates mistrust of ERA application, thus, power was a factor in the investigated ERA
processes. As suppliers perceive cost motivation due to ERA use, perhaps ERAs increase buyer power irrelevant of
‘starting points’.
The ‘illusion’ was explored by researching ERA application determinants, which exceeded the number of ERA
effects. The number of qualified alternatives, the main application factor, was one of the two main intrinsic power
determinants that generated buyer power in most cases. Additionally, the importance of the product to the purchaser,
product differentiation, and product specification were key reasons why products were chosen for ERA and key
areas in which propensity to exercise power was high. ERAs are used in buyer-centric markets, by the price
sensitive buyer.
This study has found that whilst ERAs do increase buyer power slightly, depending on the buying organisations’
‘starting point’, the experience of the ASP and the extent to which ERA increases face-to-face discussion, ERAs do
not cause a ‘power-shift’, since they are applied in buyer-centric supply markets only when the buyer has high
propensity to exercise power. In the investigated copier paper and stationery markets power did not move from
supplier to buyer because the buyer already had the balance of power. In the computer consumables market, power
remained with the seller despite ERA application. It can therefore be argued that the perceived shift in power from
supplier to buyer is more ‘illusion’, than ‘reality’.
Exploratory case research such as that conducted here obviously raises issues that form the basis for future research,
not least that such findings are not of themselves generalisable, and therefore need confirming. In addition such
issues as: variation through frequent use of ERA’s; ERA use in the private sector; and the sustainability of any
change in the balance of power would provide interesting topics for future research.
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APPENDIX 1.
Intrinsic Power results

CASE STUDY ANALYSIS

Propensity to exercise Buyer Power results Power in the Sourcing Process
Throughout the sourcing process, evidence of
both buyer and supplier power was found.
Process outcomes indicated buyer power; yet,
incomplete seller information suggested seller
power. Limited information provided by
buying organisation 2 and low trust indicated
higher buyer power. Moreover, high levels of
trust and cooperation in case 1 indicated that
power may not have been a factor.
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